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Four Models of Equality
PO- JEN YAP*

I. INTRODUcTION

Almost every modern constitution contains an equal
protection clause that seeks to guard against arbitrary or
discriminatory state practices. Legal scholars today speak of two
main ways in which a constitutional guarantee of equality may be
understood.!
First, the formal model of equality requires the state to treat
persons who are alike in a similar fashion. This principle of
equality does not demand all persons be treated identically, but
rather allows differential treatment when all sharing the relevant
differentiating characteristics are treated the same way.3 The
formal principle, however, does not provide a framework that
could help decide what characteristics are relevant in this
constitutional calculus, i.e., what appropriate criteria of relevance
may be legislatively determined.
Second, the substantive model of equality, by attempting to
identify prohibited bases of discrimination, shoulders the task of
elaborating the relevance criteria.4 Judicial understanding of the
constitutional mandate of equality, however, has not been
* LL.B. (Hons) (NUS), LL.M. candidate 2005 (Harvard). Advocate
and Solicitor of
the Supreme Court of Singapore. I was inspired to embark on this writing project after
reading Dr. Victor Ramraj's now published article, Four Models of Due Process, 2 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 492 (2004), which is a comparative study of due process rights in the common
law jurisdictions. I would like to thank him for reading and commenting on my earlier
drafts. Needless to say, I am responsible for any substantive errors that may appear in this
paper.
1. See Donna Greschner, Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?, 27 QUEEN's L.
J. 299 (2001); see also Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1167 (1983).
2. See Greschner, supra note 1, at 302-03.
3. See id.
4. See Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 1178-79.
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homogeneous.5 The cases cannot be aptly categorized under either
of the two principles of equality;6 instead, the cases lie on a
continuum between the two categorical extremes of formalism and
substantiveness In fact, a survey of the constitutional practices of
Malaysia, Singapore, India, the United States, South Africa, and
Canada reveals four approaches to equality.
First, at one end of the constitutional spectrum is the formal
model of equality, which recvuires similar treatment for all persons
who are similarly situated. Second, a corollary of the formal
principle is the rational connection model. This model does not
merely require all persons sharing the same characteristic to be
treated equally.9 Rather, this model goes further, providing that a
piece of legislation would be deemed arbitrary if the legislative
grounds do not have a rational connection to the object sought to
be achieved by the law in question.10 Third, the normative model
examines whether a rational nexus exists between the legislative
classes and legitimate state policies. This normative model requires
judicial inquiry into whether the differential treatment based on
legislative classifications burden a claimant in a manner that
reflects deeply personal social stereotypes that are immutable or
changeable only at unacceptable personal costs. Thus, the
normative model seeks to identify prohibited bases of legislative
differentiations." Finally, the substantive model, like the normative
model, attempts to identify forbidden grounds of discrimination.
However, it is the only model of equality that does not predicate a
finding of inequality upon the presence of legislative classifications
or differential treatment. The substantive model, therefore, allows
inequality to be remedied when the state treats as similar persons
who are differently situated. 2

5. John A. Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality, 85
Ky. L.J. 9,53-54 (1997); see Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 1167.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. Greschner, supra note 1, at 303.
9. See Victor V. Ramraj, Comparative Constitutional Law in Singapore, 6 SING. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 302, 312 (2002); see also Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 1177.
10. See Ramraj, supra note 9, at 312 n. 50; see also Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 1177.
11. See Stephen M. Wise, Hardly a Revolution: The Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals
J-, Dignty-Rights irtaf Liberal Democracy, 22 VT. L. REV. 793, 891-92 (1998).
12. Vicki Lens, Supreme Court Narratives on Equality and Gender Discriminationin
Employment: 1971-2002, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L. J. 501, 521 (2004).
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This Article advances two main claims. The first claim is that
the substantive model- of equality serves as the only logical and
legislative
against
guarantee
constitutional
meaningful
discrimination. The crux of this claim critiques the formal, rational
connection, and normative models of equality on the basis that
they do not approximate the true mandate of equality as it is
embodied in the substantive model.
The formal model merely requires all persons within the same
class or classification to be treated equally. 3 This "similarly
situated" test is highly deficient as an egalitarian concept because
it does not provide the crucial criteria required to determine who
is similarly situated to whom. Pursuant to this formal model,
gender discrimination against females would satisfy the mandate
of equality, as long as all females are treated the same way. The
rational connection model is not much better. It scrutinizes the
nexus between the object of the law and the legislative
classifications, but fails to question the legislative objective itself.
For instance, consider hypothetically a state that pursues a policy
of racial segregation. Any race-based legislative classification
would pass constitutional muster under the rational connection
model, as there is a rational connection between the legislative
class and the object of the law. 4
Finally, the normative model is defective as an egalitarian
concept because it only remedies inequality when discriminatory
treatment arises from legislative classifications, thereby neglecting
to remedy any inequality that results from treating differently
situated persons alike. For instance, consider hypothetically a law
that requires all candidates to pass an oral exam before they are
eligible to enroll for undergraduate studies. Although all
prospective students are treated alike, this requirement invariably
discriminates adversely against persons with speech impairments.
Nonetheless, pursuant to the normative model of equality, the

13. Greschner, supra note 1, at 302; see also generally, Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender
Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (1994).
14. This is subject to any explicit constitutionally prohibited bases of discrimination.
See, e.g., SING. CONST. (1999 Rev. Ed.) pt. IV, art. 12(2), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE WORLD 3, 21 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2001) ("ITihere shall be no discrimination
against citizens of Singapore on the ground only of religion, race... in any law"); see also
Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV.
213, 229-30 (1991) (explaining that the separate-but-equal racial classifications of the
Plessy v. Ferguson era were upheld using a rationality standard).
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legislative provision would pass constitutional muster since it does
not legislate differential treatment between groups of people.
Hence, only the substantive model of equality is a logical and
principled constitutional bulwark against arbitrary state action.
These four models, however, do not correspond exactly with
the specific jurisdictions examined. Courts in many jurisdictions
vacillate between different models, as they are undecided about
which model of equality to adopt. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to
state that some Malaysian cases support the formal model; 5
Singaporean, Indian, and American courts endorse the rational
connection approach; 6 the normative model represents the South
7
African approach and one approach in the United
8 States, and the
model.1
substantive
the
Canadian courts espouse
A discussion of the constitutional right to equality would be
incomplete without an analysis of the interpretive theories of
reasonable limits that may be placed on this right. After all, the
right to equal protection as conferred under the Constitution is the
net concession between equality rights and their limits.
Although the substantive model of equality represents the
Canadian approach, the Canadian judiciary has unfortunately
been inconsistent in its understanding of the reasonable limits that
may be placed on the constitutional right to equality.' 9 As a result
of this equivocation, the courts have often watered down the
essence of this sacrosanct right.
Naturally, I do not intend to defend the implausible claim that
there should be no limits placed on a person's constitutional right

15. Victor V. Ramraj, The Post-September 11 Fallout in Singapore and Malaysia:
Prospects for an Accommodative Liberalism, 2003 SING. J. L. STUD. 459, 466-67 (2003),
quoting Public Prosecutor v. Khong Teng Khen, [1976] 2 M.L.J. [MALAY. L.J.] 166, at
170 (Kuala Lumpur Fed. Ct.).
16. Ramraj, supra note 9, at 312. For the United States' rational basis test, see United
States v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
17. See, e.g., Harksen v. Lane, 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
18. Stephen J. Toope, Legal and Judicial Reform through Development Assistance:
Some Lessons, 48 MCGILL L.J. 357, 388 n.100 (2003).
19. See generally Alan Brudner, Guilt Under the Charter: The Lure of Parliamentary
Supremacy, 40 CRIM. L. Q. 287, 287-88 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court of Canada
has upheld laws that "trench seriously on" equality); Christopher D. Totten, Constitutional
Precommitments to Gender Affirmative Action in the European Union, Germany, Canada
and the United States: A Comparative Approach, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 27 (2003)

(arguing that Canadian courts have "have increasingly supported notions of substantive
equality").
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to equality. No right can ever be absolute, as the state must often
resolve competing claims from different sectors of society. In a
seminal article, Alan Brudner has suggested that there are two
ways in which rights and their limits may be conceived.20 The first,
a Millian understanding of rights and their limits, perceives a
constitutionally protected right as "simply the legal recognition of
a highly valued interest" such that more weighty interests can
override it to maximize overall social welfare.2 ' The second, a
Kantian approach, perceives a constitutional right not merely as a
legally protected interest, but as the respect paid to a person's
"capacity for freely forming and pursuing interests., 22 Pursuant to
this Kantian view, rights cannot be reduced to a numerical value
and forfeited on utilitarian grounds whenever it is expedient and
21
necessary. Instead, under a Kantian conception of rights, a
constitutional right may be limited only by a countervailing equal
constitutional right or "when necessary to preserve the framework
of rights itself, that is to say, in a national emergency. ' '24 The
Supreme Court of Canada, however, has been oscillating between
the two theories of reasonable limits to rights, thereby creating
laudable legal history in some cases and facing severe criticisms in
others.25
My second claim is bolder than the first: if one accepts that
the substantive model of equality embodies the only logical and
meaningful constitutional principle against arbitrary state action,
then a Kantian construction of rights-limitations would be superior
to a Millian theory of reasonable limits. Because Kantian theory
presupposes that any inquiry into rights-limitations must be
conducted in light of an equal commitment to uphold other
enshrined constitutional rights, a Millian understanding of rights
and their limits pales in comparison since it permits the robust
ideal of substantive equality to be undercut by a Utilitarian and
Consequentialist reading of reasonable limits.
This Article consists of three main parts. Part II begins with a
description of the four models of equality as exemplified by case
law. Part III examines how these four models are inherently
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Brudner, supra note 19, at 290.
Id. at 290-91.
Id. at 291.
See id.
Id. at 292.
See id. at 324-25.
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defective as constitutional safeguards against arbitrary state action.
An affirmative argument is advanced in support of the substantive
model of equality, as this model alone heeds equality's true
mandate. Finally, Part IV examines recent Canadian equal
protection jurisprudence and argues that the Canadian Supreme
Court's inconsistent and haphazard understanding of a theory of
reasonable limits to rights has compromised the substantive vision
of equality in Canada.
II. FOUR MODELS OF EQUALITY

Part II describes four models of equality that have been used
by the highest courts in Malaysia, Singapore, India, the United
States, South Africa and Canada to interpret the equal protection
clauses of their respective constitutions. At the outset, it would be
useful to restate the general Equal Protection Clause enshrined in
the constitution of each jurisdiction that guards against
discriminatory state practices.
Malaysia: "All persons are equal before the law and entitled
to the equal protection of the law. 6
Singapore: "All persons are equal before the law and entitled
to the equal protection of the law."

India: "The State shall not deny to any person equality before
the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of
India."2

United States: "No State shall... deny to 29any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.,
South Africa: "Everyone is equal before the law and has the
right to equal protection and benefit of the law... ."0
Canada: "Every individual is equal before and under the law
and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the
law without discrimination..

.3

26. MALAY. CONST. pt. II, art. 8(1), reprintedin CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD 7, 29 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1995).
27. SING. CONST. pt. IV, art. 12(1).
28. INDIA CONST. pt. III, art. 14, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD 2, 31 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2003).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 1, § 9(1), reprintedin CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD 1, 12 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2004).
31. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 15(1).
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In many of these jurisdictions, additional constitutional
provisions exist that enumerate specific bases of discrimination
that are expressly prohibited, but these are beyond the scope of
this Article. 32The equal protection clauses in question are similarly
worded and state a broader general principle that constrains the
ability of the state to differentiate between groups of people in the
absence of specific instances of discrimination that are explicitly
proscribed.
By comparing these four constitutional models of equality as
interpreted by case law, we can better appreciate the interpretive
options that are available to the courts in each jurisdiction. This
comparative exercise will permit us to scrutinize the rationale and
ramifications of endorsing one model over another in Part III of
this Article.
A. Formal Model
Pursuant to the formal model, the mandate of equality is
satisfied if the state treats all persons within each legislative
classification alike.33 Hence, the state may classify persons along
any legislative baselines so long as it treats all people within each
legislative class the same way and does not single out any person
within the same classification for discriminatory treatment.
The formal model has been endorsed by the Malaysian courts
in Public Prosecutor v. Khong Teng Khen 5 In that case, the
defendant was tried under the Essential Regulations as opposed to
the Criminal Procedure Code. He argued that the different rules of
evidence and procedure laid out in the Regulations violated
Article 8(1) of the Malaysia Constitution, which provides that "all
persons... are entitled to equal protection of the law. ' , 36 The
federal court rejected his argument and held that
[tihe principle underlying Article 8 is that a law must operate
alike on all persons under like circumstances. .

.

. All that

Article 8 guarantees is that a person in one class should be

32. See, e.g., MALAY. CONST. pt. II, § 8(2); SING. CONST. pt. IV, art. 12(2); S. AFR.
CONST. ch. 1, § 9(3).
33. Greschner, supra note 1, at 303.
34. Wojciech Sadurski, The Concept of Legal Equality and an Underlying Theory of
Discrimination,1998 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 63, 67-71 (1998); see also

Greschner, supra note 1, at 303.
35.

Khong Teng Khen, [1976] 2 M.L.J. 166.

36. Id. at 170 (quoting MALAY. CONST. pt. II, art. 8(2)).

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 27:63

treated the same as another person in the same class, so that a
juvenile must be tried like another juvenile, a ratepayer in one
area should pay the same rate as paid by another ratepayer in
the same area, and a millionare the same income tax as another
millionaire, and so on.

37

Hence, according to the federal court, the Equal Protection
Clause of the constitution would not be violated as long as every
person tried under the Regulations was subjected to the same
rules.
Under the formal model of equality, the court must ascertain
whether the state has been treating persons within each legislative
category similarly.38 The court neither examines
the
reasonableness of the legislative classifications nor investigates
whether the classifications have any connection with the legislative
object.39 Pursuant to this model, all forms of legislative
classifications are permissible; whether they further the aims of the
legislative policy in question is also immaterial. 40 Thus, the court is
only concerned about discriminatory administrative decisions, not
discriminatory legislation.
B. Rational Connection Model
According to the rational connection model of equality, the
court examines the constitutional permissiveness of legislative
classifications. However, the reasonableness of the legislative
classes is determined by whether the.classifications have a rational
connection with the legislative policy in question or to legitimate
legislative goals.' So long as the legislative classes further a
legitimate state interest or the ends of the law, the legislative
provision in question is constitutionally valid.42 This model of
equality, also known as the doctrine of rational classification, has
its origins in American constitutional jurisprudence. 43 Although
American courts no longer exclusively apply the doctrine of

37. Id.
38. See Greschner, supra note 1, at 302-03.
39. Id.
40. Id.; but see Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor, [1981] 1 M.L.J. 64, 72.
41. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234-35 (1981).
42. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also
Harksen, 1998 (1) SA 300 at 320.
43. See Gregory S. Chernack, The Clash of Two Worlds: Justice Robert H. Jackson,
InstitutionalPragmatism,and Brown, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 51,103 (1999).
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rational classification, this model of equality still finds favor with
Singaporean and Malaysian courts. 44
Recently in Taw Cheng Kong, the Singapore Court of Appeal
faced the question of whether an extraterritorial legislative
provision that applied only to Singapore citizens violated Article
12(1) of the Singapore Constitution, which guarantees that "all
persons are.., entitled to the equal protection of the law. 4 5 In
deciding whether the differential treatments (i.e., legislative
classifications) between citizens and non-citizens were reasonable,
the court looked to whether "the classification was founded on
intelligible differentia and whether the differentia bore a rational
relation to the object of the provision - in other words, a nexus
must be established., 46 The court eventually concluded that there
was a rational nexus between the legislative differentia 47 (i.e.,
citizens and non-citizens) and the object of the law, which sought
to prevent and suppress corruption while abiding by the comity of
nations. 48 The court upheld the constitutional validity of the
legislative provision.49
This approach to equality in Singapore can be traced to 1981,
when the Privy Council, Singapore's court of last resort, approved
the doctrine of rational classification in Ong Ah Chuan. In that
case, the issue was whether imposing the death penalty upon drug
traffickers who traffic in fifteen grams or more of heroin violated
the Equal Protection Clause. 51 The differential treatment between
the classes of individuals concerned the quantity of the drug
involved in the offense. Lord Diplock concluded that "[p]rovided
that the factor which the legislature adopts as constituting the
dissimilarity in circumstances is not purely arbitrary but bears a
reasonable relation to the social object of the law, there is no
inconsistency with Article 12(1) of the Constitution., 52 The court

44. Ramraj, supra note 9, at 312; see generally 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law §
812 (2004) (describing the "three degrees of scrutiny.., applied by the [U.S.] courts in
analyzing statutes challenged under the Equal Protection Clause").
45. Public Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng Kong, [Court of Appeal] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 410, 427
(1998) (quoting SING. CONST. pt. IV, art. 12(1)).
46. Id.at 431.
47. Id.

48. Id.at 434.
49. Id. at 437-38.
50. Ong Ah Chuan, [1981] 1 M.L.J. 64.
51. Id.

52. Id. at 72.
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held that a rational nexus was established on the facts since there
was a reasonable relationship or connection between the
legislative classes at issue and the legislature's desire to impose
stricter punishment on illicit dealers who traffic in larger quantities
of addictive drugs." More significantly, the Privy Council
pronounced that the courts should not question the reasonableness
of the legislative policy, as "[u]nder the Constitution, which is
based on the separation of powers, these are questions which it 5is
'4
the function of the legislature to decide, not that of the judiciary.
The Malaysian courts reached a similar position in Datuk
Yong Teck Lee." In that case, the plaintiff argued that section
27(8) of the Police Act, which imposed a higher mandatory fine for
Parliamentarians who engaged in illegal demonstrations than on
similarly offending non-Parliamentarians, violated Article 8(1) of
the Malaysia Constitution.56 The court applied the doctrine of
rational classification and found a rational nexus between the
differentia (i.e., Parliamentarians and non-Parliamentarians) and
the object of the legislative provision, which may have been "to
keep Parliamentarians and assemblymen on the floor in the august
Houses and keep them away from the streets."57 What is
noteworthy, however, is that the court found it unnecessary and
improper to adjudicate upon the necessity and appropriateness of
this legislative policy: "The question whether the impugned Act or
its section is unjust is a matter to be debated and decided by
Parliament and it does not require judicial determination.... It is
not for the court to consider
the propriety or the wisdom of the
58
statute.
the
of
provision
This rational connection approach to equality is also evident
in the Indian case of Bhatia v. Union of Inda.9 The applicant in
question challenged the constitutional validity of an amendment to
the Rent Act that restricted the protection of rent-control
legislation to premises for which the monthly rent was below 3500

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Datuk Yong Teck Lee v. Public Prosecutor, reprinted in [1993] 1 M. L. J.295
(Kota Kinabalu High Ct.).
56. Id. at 297-98.
57. .

l.

J..

58. Id. at 304.
59. (1995) 1 S.C.C. 104.
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rupees.' After determining that the object of the Amending Act
was to "rationalise the rent-control law by bringing about a
balance between the interests of landlords and tenants," the
Supreme Court of India found a rational connection between the
legislative classifications and the object of the law. 6' The supreme
court held that Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, which
prohibits the state from denying any person equal protection of
the law, "can only be invoked if the classification is made on the
grounds which are totally irrelevant to the object of the statute." 62
More importantly, the Court "will not63 question its validity on the
ground of lack of legislative wisdom. ,
Pursuant to the rational connection model of equality, any
legislative classifications that a state enacts must bear a rational
and logical connection to the policy it seeks to pursue. 64 Hence,
purely arbitrary legislative classes that do not further the aims of
the legislative objective will be deemed null and void. 6' However,
the Court will not consider the wisdom or propriety of the
legislative policy. 66 Taken to its logical conclusion, the Court would
even sustain legislative policies that are invidiously discriminatory,
unreasonable, irrational or unjust, so long as there is some nexus
between the object sought to be achieved and the classifications.
C. Normative Model
The normative model of equality is markedly superior to the
rational connection model since normative considerations enter
into the former's constitutional calculus. Pursuant to this model,
the court ensures there is a rational nexus between the legislative
classes and permissible state objectives, 67 and that the legislative
60. Id. at 105.
61. Id. at 113.
62. Id. at 114.
63. Id. at 121.
64. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
65. See, e.g., Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 621-22 (1985)
(striking down a state law held not rationally related to the asserted legislative objective).
66. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
67. In some cases, the national courts merely confined their normative review to the
propriety of the legislative policy at hand and did not further adjudicate the
reasonableness or moral relevance of the legislative classifications. This was the approach
taken by the Supreme Court of India in Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University, 2 S.C.C. 145
(1989). A similar approach can be observed in some American jurisprudence interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which mandates that "no State
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
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classifications are in themselves reasonable. This requires that the
differential treatment based on legislative classifications not
impose a burden upon the claimant in a manner that reflects social
stereotypes of deeply personal characteristics that are immutable
or changeable only at unacceptable personal costs.68 Effectively,
the normative model seeks to identify prohibited bases of
legislative differentiations.
In the U.S. Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was originally drafted as a safeguard
against racial discrimination. A central concern has been to
eradicate any government action tainted by a prejudice against
"discrete and insular minorities" 69 who are "relatively powerless to
protect their interests in the political process."7 ° In Edwards v.
California,Justice Jackson suggested in a concurring opinion that
a state cannot consider certain "neutral factors" such as race,
creed, and color, standing alone, when establishing legislative
classes. 7' The U.S. Supreme Court also extended the guarantee of
equal protection beyond the Fourteenth Amendment's historical
origins; for instance, criteria such as alienage and gender are now

CONST. amend. XIV. In United States v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973), the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed that legislative classification could only be sustained if "the
classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest" (emphasis
added). The Court subsequently went on to state that if the constitutional conception of
"equal protection of the laws [is to mean] anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest." Id. at 534. This strain of Indian and American cases
might be explained on the basis that the legislative policies at issue were so egregiously
unfair and arbitrary that the courts did not find it necessary to further decide whether the
legislative classifications ran afoul of the mandate of equality. Furthermore, the courts
were reluctant to explicitly articulate new prohibited bases of discrimination and were
content to leave the adjudication of the legitimacy of such legislative differentiations to
another occasion. While this strain of cases differed from the decisions discussed in the
main text in that the courts did not examine explicitly the reasonableness or moral
relevance of the legislative classes, these cases nonetheless fall within the same conceptual
category of equality because normative considerations entered the constitutional calculus
when the courts adjudicated the legitimacy and reasonableness of the legislative policies.
68. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that a Colorado
constitutional amendment that forbade the specific protection of homosexuals from
discrimination was invalid because it was designed solely to harm a politically unpopular
group, and hence served no legitimate government interest).
69. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
70. Id. at 152.
71. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941).
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also suspect classifications. In Reed v. Reed, the Court considered
the constitutionality of a state statute that preferred male over
female applicants when two individuals were otherwise equally
entitled to appointment as administrator of an estate.73 While
agreeing that the statutory objective of "reducing the workload on
probate courts by eliminating one class of contests is not without
some legitimacy," the Court held that "[tlo give a mandatory
preference to members of either sex over members of the other,
merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is
to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by
the Equal Protection Clause." Later, in Frontiero v. Richardson,
the Court denounced gender discrimination by stating that "sex,
like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth."74 Hence, while
legislative classifications along racial or gender lines may bear a
rational nexus with valid statutory policies, such classifications are
generally forbidden by the government.75
The South African Constitutional Court, in contrast, has been
more expansive in its interpretation of the country's Equal
Protection Clause. The Constitutional Court first laid out the test
for discrimination under Section Eight of the interim Constitution,
now incorporated under Section Nine of the final Constitution.16 In
Harksen v. Lane, the court first considered whether the legislative
provision differentiates between categories of people.7 7 If so, the
differentiation must bear a rational connection to a legitimate
government purpose. 8 Similar to the American approach, the
South African Court would subsequently investigate the
reasonableness of the legislative classification. If the classification
is not expressly prohibited by the Constitution, the claimant may
still show that unfair discrimination nonetheless occurred by
proving that the grounds for discrimination are "based on

72. While legislative classes drawn along racial and gender baselines are treated as
suspect categories and are prima facie forbidden, U.S. courts have allowed more limits on
a person's right against gender discrimination. This is discussed more fully in Part IV.
73. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
74. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
75. See id. at 688. The state bears the burden of proving that the limitation on a
person's right to equality is justified. Different tiers of judicial scrutiny exist for different
bases of discrimination. See also Part IV.
76. Harksen, 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC).
77. Id. at 336.
78. Id. at 321.
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attributes or characteristics which have the potential to impair the
fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings."79 The
test of unfairness focuses primarily on the .impact of the
discrimination on the complainant and others in his situation. In
evaluating whether the discrimination was unfair, the court
considers the nature of the interests at stake and whether the
applicant belongs to a group that has been historically
disadvantaged. 8° The South African constitutional system has been
more flexible and expansive than its American counterpart in
precluding discriminatory classifications. 8' Although the South
African Constitution provides a list of prohibited bases of
discrimination, the court has invalidated analogous unspecified
grounds of discrimination that are based on "immutable biological
attributes or characteristics,.., associational life of humans
[and]... intellectual, expressive and religious dimensions of
humanity. 8 2 For example, in Larbi-Odam v. Member of the
Executive Council for Education, the
Constitutional
Court
invalidated an employment statute that discriminated on the basis
of citizenship.83 In Hoffmann v. South African Airways, the court
struck down an airline recruitment policy that discriminated
against persons with HIV. 84
Some critics may also be surprised that I have classified the
South African and American approaches in the same category.
After all, South African jurisprudence is more sophisticated and
nuanced than the American system; the former, unlike the latter,
demands not only a judicial examination of the impugned
legislation, but also requires equality to be determined against the

79. Id. at 322.
80. Id. at 336.
81. See generally Jennifer C. Lukoff, Comment, South Africa Takes the Initial Step
Toward a Brilliant Twenty-First Century: A Comparative Study of State v. Kampher &
Bowers v. Hardwick, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 459, 460 (1999) (arguing that
South Africa's constitutional system protects the rights of all citizens, unlike the United
States where the rights of certain groups may have historically been impaired); Adila
Hassim, Affirmative Action Policies in the United States and South Africa: A Comparative
Study, 2000 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 119, 160-61 (2000) (suggesting that

the South African high court's approach to equality should be adopted in the United
States).
82. Harksen, 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at 323.
83. Larbi-Odam v. Member of the Exec. Council for Educ., 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC).
84. Hoffmann v. South African Airways, 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC).
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larger social, political, and legal context.85 South African courts
have also recognized some forms of adverse-impact discrimination.
For instance, the Constitutional Court has used socio-historical
data to determine whether indirect racial discrimination is being
perpetuated despite the absence of laws that are facially
discriminatory on the basis of race.86 However, as much as the
South African emphasis on socio-historical context and its
recognition of indirect discrimination is distinct from the U.S.
approach, these differentiating features constitute a distinction in
interpretive methodology as opposed to a conceptual difference.
Both the South African and the American approaches to equality
are conceptually identical: both constitutional systems not only
ensure that there is a rational nexus between the legislative classes
and legitimate state policies, but they also examine whether the
state has taken into consideration morally irrelevant traits in
drafting the impugned legislative classifications.87
The general normative model of equality imports a moral
precept that limits the scope of legislative classifications. This
model further instructs that some differences should be treated as
accidental and are normally ignored in legislative allocation of
benefits and burdens. Thus, this model of equality provides the
moral framework to determine which criteria are relevant in
deciding what type of persons are sufficiently different and could
be treated differently. Like the aforementioned models of
equality, however, the normative model focuses only on
differential treatment between categories of people and legislative

85. See generally Hassim, supra note 81, at 126-27 (quoting S. AFR. CONST. ch. 8 §§
167-69, which provides that a court interpreting the Bill of Rights "must promote the
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, an
freedom," must consider international law, and may consider foreign law).
86. In Pretoria City Council v. Walker, 1998 (2) SALR 363 (CC), the South African
Constitutional Court held that differential state treatment by geographical areas had
indirectly constituted racial discrimination. The court held that the prohibition against
racial discrimination extended to laws that did not facially distinguish on the grounds of
race, but was nonetheless its effect. However, it is important to note that the impugned
legislation in question was not a facially neutral law of general application, unlike the
Canadian examples of Vriend and Eldridge. Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.R. 493, 579;
Eldridge v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.R. 624. The law here had categorized persons
into groups on the basis of the geographical areas in which they resided.
87. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 620 (illustrating the United States' approach); LarbiOdam, 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) (illustrating the South African approach).
88. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949).
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classifications. Hence, the Equal Protection Clause would not be
violated if all persons were treated in an identical fashion.
Therefore,
the
normative
model
requires
legislative
differentiations between people to trigger judicial review, thus
ignoring inequality that occurs when differently situated persons
are treated alike.
D. Substantive Model
To date, the substantive model stands as the most
sophisticated model of equality. Like the normative model, it
permits an investigation into the moral relevance of legislative
classifications to decide whether the mandate of equality has been
complied with. The difference between this model and the others
lies in its recognition that facially neutral laws of general
application-such as legislative classifications-may nonetheless
result in discrimination.
Unlike South African and American jurisprudence, judicial
review on equality grounds may be triggered in Canada even if
there are no legislative classifications or differentiations 9 In
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, the Supreme Court
of Canada first proposed that "identical treatment may frequently
produce serious inequality." 9
Subsequently, Eldridge v. British Columbia led to the first
successful adverse discrimination claim arising from a law of
general application.9 In that case, the claimants argued that
certain provincial Medicare legislations violated Section 15(1) of
the Charter because they failed to provide medical interpreter
services for hearing impaired persons. Particularly significant was
that the Medicare system did not, on its face, make an explicit
distinction based on disability by singling out hearing-impaired
persons for differential treatment. 93 Instead, those with and
without hearing disabilities were entitled to the same medical
services.94 Nevertheless, the appellants contended that the lack of
funding for sign language interpreters rendered them incapable of
benefiting from the legislation to the same extent as hearing
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See, e.g., Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 56 D.L.R. 1.
Id. at 10.
Eldridge, [1997] S.C.R. 624.
id. at 625.
Id. at 626.
Id.
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persons. 5 The supreme court agreed, holding that discrimination
against hearing impaired persons resulted from "the construction
of a society based solely on 'mainstream' attributes to which
disabled persons will never be able to gain access., 96 On behalf of
the unanimous court, Justice La Forest stated:
Discrimination can arise both from the adverse effects of rules
of general application as well as from express distinctions
flowing from the distribution of benefits. Given this state of
affairs, I can think of no principled reason why it should not be
possible to establish a claim of discrimination based on the
adverse effects of a facially neutral benefit scheme. 97
Building on Eldridge in Vriend v. Alberta, the supreme court
declared that a provincial human rights law violated Section 15(1)
of the Charter by failing to include
sexual orientation as a
S98
prohibited ground of discrimination. In dismissing the Provincial
Government's argument that the legislative omission did not
extend remedies for discrimination to either heterosexuals or
homosexuals, the court observed that discrimination against
heterosexuals based on sexual orientation was far less pervasive
than discrimination against homosexuals. Thus, "there is a clear
distinction created by the disproportionate impact" that arose
from the legislative exclusion of sexual orientation as an illegal
basis of discrimination."
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to invalidate
any facially neutral legislation of general application that may have
a discriminatory impact, absent an invidious discriminatory
purpose. 1°° In Washington v. Davis, the applicants challenged the
constitutional validity of a qualifying test, administered to all
prospective police officers that had an adverse impact on AfricanAmerican candidates. 1 In rejecting their claims, the Supreme
Court articulated that it had never declared that "a law, neutral on
its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of

95. See id. at 629.
96. Id. at 674.
97. Eldridge, [1997] S.C.R. at 680.
98. Vriend, [1998] S.C.R. at 579.
99. Id. at 542- 543.
100. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also Jeffery A. Kruse,
Note, Substantive Equal Protection Analysis Under State v. Russell, and the Potential
Impact on the CriminalJustice System, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1791, 1797-98 (1993).
101. Davis, 426 U.S. 229.
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government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one
race than of another."' 2 Hence, in the United States, the Supreme
Court has slammed the door shut on substantive equality, by
refusing to acknowledge that at times, treating differently situated
persons alike may perpetuate and not ameliorate inequality.
Canadian Supreme Court Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin
most succinctly captured the essence of substantive equality: "The
theme behind this concept of equality is the belief that if equality
is to be realized, we must move beyond formal legalism to
measures that will make a practical difference in the lives of
members of groups that have been traditionally subject to the
tactics of subordination. ' 3 This model of equality recognizes that
the adverse effect of discrimination may exist in facially neutral
laws. While equal opportunity may be prima facie available for all
members of society to enjoy, the legislative failure to consider
certain differences based on personal characteristics may serve to
condone unequal treatment by treating differently-situated
persons in a like manner. Thus, the mandate of substantive
equality lies in the betterment of societal members, who have been
historically subordinated and disadvantaged, through positive
enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause.
III.

EVALUATING THE FOUR MODELS

A. Formal Model
Pursuant to the formal model of equality, all individuals must
be treated similarly to the extent that they are the same.'0° Prima
facie, this principle sounds unequivocally fair. However, the formal
model simply presumes that people may be equal or unequal by
virtue of certain characteristics they possess or lack, but it fails to
articulate a moral standard for determining what traits are relevant
in this constitutional calculus. It also provides no criteria to assess
the propriety of any legislative differential treatment of persons
who are not alike. As noted by Peter Westen, "[formal] equality is
an empty vessel with no substantive moral content of its own.

102. Id. at 242.
103. Beverley McLachlin, The Evolution of Equality, 54 THE ADVOCATE 559, 563
(1996).
104. See Greschner, supra note 1, at 303.
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Without moral standards, equality remains meaningless, a formula
that can have nothing to say about how we should act."10 5 No single
individual is identical to another, as human beings are similar and
different from one another in an infinite number of ways. Unless
some restrictions are placed on the types of character traits that
can be relevant for differential treatment, the principle of equality
becomes tautological and meaningless.
Consider, for instance, a hypothetical legislative provision
that states, "No females shall be allowed to attend public schools."
This rule clearly singles out females for differential treatment by
denying them public education. According to the formal principles
of equality laid out by the Malaysian court in Khong Teng Khen,
the constitutional mandate of equality merely guarantees that "a
person in one class should be treated the same as another person
in the same class."1' Hence, since females form a separate class
from males, the mandate of equality is satisfied so long as all
females are treated the same way under the legislative policy.
Under the formal model of equality, the court is merely
required to ensure that the state has treated all persons within a
particular legislative category in the same way.1°7 By not examining
whether the legislative class is in itself reasonable, or whether the
classifications further the ends of the legislative objects, all forms
of legislative classifications could be constitutionally permissible,
however irrational, silly or arbitrary they may be. Consider, for
example, if the above legislative provision is redrafted to read:
"No shortsighted person shall be allowed to attend public school."
Again, there are two distinct legislative classes because persons
with myopia are sieved out from those with perfect vision for
differential treatment. According to the formal model of equality,
the state is only bound to deny all shortsighted persons public
education and grant all persons with perfect vision access to public
schools. Hence, the judiciary would intervene if some students
with myopia are admitted into public schools while others similarly
situated are kept away. It seems that under the formal model, all
legislation would satisfy the constitutional mandate of equality,
since the similarly situated test "catches every conceivable

105.
106.
107.

Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982).
Khong Teng Khen, [1976] 2 M.L.J. 166.
See Greschner, supra note 1, at 303.
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difference in legal treatment."' 8 The court's task is to merely
intervene when discriminatory administrative decisions are made
and not when discriminatory legislations are enacted. 1°9 This is
certainly a strange state of affairs: the mandate of judicial review is
to subject legislation to judicial scrutiny under all provisions of the
Constitution. There is no logical reason why legislators should
benefit from a de facto exemption from scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause when they are subjected to more stringent
judicial probes on other constitutional fronts.
Perhaps the most explicit judicial rejection of the formal
model has been voiced by Canadian Supreme Court Justice
McIntyre in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia: "[A] bad
law will not be saved merely because it operates equally upon
those to whom it has application."' 110 If the similarly situated test
was applied literally, "[i]t could be used to justify the Nuremberg
laws of Adolf Hitler. Similar treatment was contemplated for all
Jews."'
The similarly situated test is "seriously deficient" as a
constitutional principle as it does not supply "the crucial criteria
that are required to determine who is similarly situated to whom,
and what kinds of difference in treatment are appropriate to those
who are not similarly situated.""' In excluding any consideration
of the nature, purpose, content, and impact of the law," 3 the formal
model of equality is merely a mandate for administrative
consistency. The formal model does not afford a realistic test for
determining whether a state has violated an individual's or a
group's constitutional right to equal treatment and protection.
B. Rational Connection Model
The rationalconnection model of equality seeks to circumvent
the tautological problems of the formal model by measuring the
propriety of the legislative classifications against the object of the

108. Mahe v. The Queen, [1987] 80 A.R. 161,185.
109. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (holding that the Court does not have an
"unconditioned authority to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive
acts" due to the case or controversy requirement set forth in U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
110. Andrews, [1989] 56 D.L.R. 1 at 12.
111. id.
112.

PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 1242 (4th ed. 1997).

113. See Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 1177; see also Andrews, supra note 110, at 13.
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law. In other words, the relevant class must bear a rational
connection to the statutory purpose.
The formulation of equality is marginally better than its
formal predecessor, but it is subject to legislative manipulation. By
framing the purpose of the law narrowly, the legislature would
always be able to establish a logical nexus between the legislative
class and the purpose. For instance, if the Canadian Parliament
decides to pass a piece of legislation with the purpose of
"exempting all Ministers' sons from national service," the
legislative classifications (i.e., ministers' sons and non-ministers'
sons) would thus invariably bear a rational nexus to the object
sought to be achieved. As S.M. Huang-Thio indicated, "[i]n this
long as
way, discriminatory provisions can be validly enacted
1 14 so
terms.
narrow
in
formulated
is
the purpose of the law
An alternative argument advanced against the rational
connection model argues that "[i]t is always possible to define the
legislative purpose of a statute in such a way that the statutory
classification is rationally related to it" because "the reach of the
purpose has been derived from the classifications themselves.""' 5
Seen in this light, the definition of the legislative purpose
would be a tautology because the classification would always
coincide with the object of the law. In every case in which the
courts have struck down a legislative provision for failing the
rational nexus test, it would have been equally possible for the
courts to define the purpose so that the court could have deemed
the statute rational.'
Courts can either sustain or reject the rationality of the
legislation by manipulating the level of abstraction of the
legislative object. In Taw Cheng Kong, the High Court of
Singapore held that the objective of the extraterritorial legislative
provision in question was "to address acts of corruption taking
place outside Singapore but affecting events" inside. The High
Court's definition of the legislative objective allowed the judge to
observe that the legislative provision caught a class of people not
contemplated by the legislative objective (i.e., Singaporean citizens
who lived and worked abroad, and who committed corrupt acts
114. S.M. Thio, Equal Protectionand Rational Classification, 1963 PUB. L. 412,428.
115. Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123,
128 & n.32 (1973).
116. Id. at 132.
117. Taw Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor, [1998] 1 S.L.R. 943, 946 (Sing. Ct. App.).

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 27:63

abroad that had no impact on Singapore). 18 Thus, the High Court
held that citizenship was "not a useful criteria for determining
guilt"" 9 because the "strength of the nexus between the objective
and the classification is not sufficiently strong to justify the
derogation"12 from the constitutional mandate of equality.
The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that the intent of
Parliament was to increase the effectiveness of corruption
prevention
while
observing international
comity. 12' A
differentiation among citizens and non-citizens was rationally
connected to the furtherance of the legislative aim. Therefore, how
a court defines or formulates the legislative purpose invariably
allows it to decide the rationality of the statutory classifications.
Thus, the rational connection model of equality is not a
constitutional tool for testing the constitutional validity of a
statute, but a method for justifying its legality.
When focusing on the relationship between the purpose of
the law and the legislative classification, this model also fails to
consider whether the purpose is in itself legitimate and fair. For
instance, assume the legislature passes a statute that bars females
from seeking public office. If the object of the law were framed as
such, any gender classifications pursuant to this objective would
still bear a rational nexus to the purpose at hand and would be
sustained as constitutionally valid under this model of equality.
Logically, a constitutional model of equality without limits on the
goals that a legislature may pursue would also legitimize the
apartheid regime in South Africa and the Nuremberg laws of Nazi
Germany since the racial classifications invariably bear a rational
nexus with the statutory goals.
C. Normative Model
The normative model of equality is a progressive formulation
of equality because it seeks to eliminate discrimination by
disallowing differentiation on morally irrelevant grounds. 2 The
normative model thus furnishes the framework to determine the
relevant characteristics for differentiating legislative treatment.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See id. at 966-67.
Id. at 967.
id. at 963-64.
Id.
See generally Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 88, at 353-56.
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This model of equality focuses not only upon the ends of the law,
but also upon the means by which the goals are achieved.
The major shortcoming of this model of equality is that it
focuses only on differential treatment and legislative
classifications. The equality clause would not be invoked if the
legislature fails to distinguish between persons and treats all
persons in the same way. The normative model, therefore, requires
legislative differentiations to trigger judicial review. Thus, it leaves
inequality-which occurs when differently situated persons are
treated alike - unremedied.

Consider, for instance, the following legislative provision:
"All applicants to public universities must pass an oral
examination before they are eligible for undergraduate studies."
On its face, this legislation does not distinguish between any
groups of persons as all candidates are treated alike under the law,
with no exceptions. Yet, undeniably, this admission policy
adversely discriminates against persons with speech impairments.
Unfortunately, there would be no judicial redress on equality
grounds pursuant to the normative model of equality since there is
no attempt by the government to differentiate persons into
separate categories. If the admission policy was "No speech
impaired persons would be admitted into public universities," the
courts would have grounds to intervene under the normative
model because the legislature has facially classified prospective
students into two categories, i.e., mute and non-mute persons. Yet,
the consequences of both admission policies are the same: speech
impaired persons are denied publicly funded undergraduate
education.
In many facets of life, it is pointless to insist on the same
treatment for everyone when the impact on some persons would
be significantly different. Discrimination can flow both from
legislations that classify persons and from facially neutral statutes
of general application. As William Black and Lynn Smith argue,
"it often makes sense to identify the purposes of a process and to
ask whether they have been achieved in equal measure for all
participants."' 24 This substantive vision of equality has led
Canadian courts to recognize a duty to accommodate relevant

123. See generally id.
124. William Black & Lynn Smith, The Equality Rights, in THE CANADIAN CHARTER
OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOM 14-11 (Carswell 1996).
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differences in conferring benefits and burdens on persons before
the law.'25
This duty to accommodate is not wholly novel: it originates
from the inverse of Aristotle's formulation of equality that often
goes ignored (i.e., the precept to treat all different persons
differently). 26 Sometimes a uniform application of the same rule to
differently situated persons may result in inequality. If the
mandate of equality requires a normative review of differentia,
there is no reason to disallow substantive review of those criteria
or traits that would demand differential treatment by the state.
D. Substantive Model
The substantive model of equality seeks to determine what
criteria would demand differential treatment by the state and what
personal traits would forbid legislative distinctions.2 7 The
substantive model of equality necessitates an examination of the
concrete impact of state action. This model demands that an
equality claim be examined within a broader social and political
context, taking into account persistent disadvantages suffered by
certain groups, independent of the differentiating or facially
neutral law under scrutiny.
What distinguishes the substantive model from the other
models is its capacity to remedy discrimination that arises from
facially neutral laws of general application (i.e., laws that do not
categorize people into groups). In Vriend, the legislature omitted
sexual orientation as a prohibited ground for discrimination in the
provincial human rights legislation. '2This omission, however, did
not stop the Supreme Court of Canada from venturing outside the
legislative box to examine the contextual experiences of the
heterosexual and homosexual communities in the real world. 2 9
The substantive model requires judges to confront the reality
that systemic abuse may be suffered by persons "because of their
place in the established discriminatory hierarchies, whether they

125. See Eldridge, [19971 S.C.R. at 680; see also Vriend, [1998] S.C.R. at 579.
126. See Kathleen E. Mahoney, Charter Equality: Has It Delivered?, in RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN UK - CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 95, 100-03 (Gavin W.
Anderson ed., 1999); see McLachlin, supra note 103, at 560.
127. See Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 1178.
128. See Vriend, [1998] S.C.R. at 544.
129. See id.
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be sexual, racial or otherwise,"' 3 beyond the facially neutral
dimensions of the law. According to the substantive model, the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection seeks to ameliorate
actual inequality as opposed to abstract inequality.'31
The substantive vision of equality is perhaps most consonant
with Ronald Dworkin's philosophical understanding of
egalitarianism. 32 Dworkin argues that equality does not prescribe
the right to equal treatment for all persons but the right of a
person to equal concern and respect He proposes that the law
does not always need to equally distribute resources, opportunity,
and burdens to every person; instead, the legal process should
reflect equal concern and respect for all persons affected by the
law. 34 The right to equal concern and respect may often translate
into an equal distribution of goods and benefits, but at times this
right can only be duly observed through the legislative
implementation of differential treatments.
Nonetheless, the substantive vision of equality is not without
its critics. It has been argued that "courts are not meant to address
any pre-existing disadvantages arising outside of law, which are
created by broader social structures. That role is for the
democratic body of the legislature.' 3 6 This statement criticizes the
substantive model of equality on two fronts: the legitimacy and the
scope of substantive judicial review in equal protection
adjudication.
The legitimacy of judicial review has often been questioned
by Robert H. Bork. He argues that when courts are used as
vehicles for social change, the judiciary is used "to enforce the
objectives of a dominant minority above the democratic
process."'37 For Bork, the scope of a constitutional clause has to be
interpreted in light of its framers' original understanding: the
constitutional understanding of equality may only be used to

130. Mahoney, supra note 126, at 106.
131. See McLachlin, supra note 103, at 563.
132. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
133. See id. at 272-73.
134. See id.
135. See id.; see also Martha A. McCarthy & Joanna L. Radbord, Foundations for
15(1): Equality Rights in Canada,6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 261,294 (1999).
136. McCarthy & Radbord, supra note 135, at 267-68.
137. ROBERT BORK, COERCING VIRTUE-THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES, 135

(2003).
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address the specific mischief the framers had in mind and its scope
cannot expand or evolve with the times.38
It seems inescapable, however, that the framers of most, if not
all, modern constitutions have deliberately chosen open-textured
and relativistic terms in their general equal protection clauses
instead of expressly confining the scope of the equal protection
clauses to specific bases of discrimination. After all, various
constitutions include a number of provisions that are highly
specific and particular. For example, in Canada, no person may be
'
elected as senator unless he is "of the full age of thirty years."139
The framers did not state that the Senate candidate must be of
"reasonable age and sufficient maturity." In the United States,
elections for the House of Representatives have to be held every
two years' 4° and not "periodically" or "regularly."
Given that the framers of the six constitutions discussed in
this Article intentionally drafted their equal protection clauses
ambiguously with the full understanding that the language could
be interpreted in various ways, the choice to adopt a broader
principle must thus be respected. Hence, the best way to effectuate
the original intents of these framers is to allow the judiciary to
interpret the value-laden and fluid concept of equality in light of
"evolving standards of decency,"' 141 rather than shackle it to the
"outmoded mores of yesteryear.' ' 142
As for whether courts should confine themselves to
examining the law in question or be allowed to scrutinize the
context in which the law operates, my earlier arguments have
already suggested an answer. Once the notion of a vacuous
constitutional guarantee of equality is accepted, there is little
reason to arbitrarily limit the scope of judicial review to legislative
differentiations and ignore similar treatments by the state, unless a
moral framework exists in which various criteria of relevance may
be determined. If the constitutional mandate of equality requires a
normative scrutiny of differentia or classes that are foreclosed to
the State, there is no rationale for disallowing a substantive review
of those criteria or traits that would require differential treatment
by the State.
138. See id. at 51-57.
139. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) pt. IV (Legislative Power) R23 (i).

140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
141. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
142. Reyes v. The Queen, 2002 (2) W.L.R. 1034.
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Discrimination may exist when we treat like persons
differently and different persons alike. Unlike legislative
differentiations, however, the only way in which one may
determine whether a piece of legislation prescribing similar state
treatment has resulted in discriminatory action is to examine the
socio-political context in which the law operates. This form of state
discrimination can only be remedied by looking outside the
statutory confines of the legislation. As observed by Chief Justice
Beverley McLachlin, the quality of a constitutional guarantee of
equality lay not in "pious platitudes, but in actually using the law
to end the disadvantage and discrimination that people suffer
because their personal characteristics
and beliefs slot them into a
143
non-privileged category.,

IV. SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY AND ITS LIMITS

To date, the Canadian judiciary remains the only court that
has pursued a substantive vision of equality, in the sense described
earlier, within its constitutional framework. Part IV examines how
the Supreme Court of Canada has sought to reconcile the
constitutional right of equality with other competing rights and
interests.

In Canada, even if a legislative provision violates Section
15(1) of the Charter (i.e., the Equal Protection Clause), the
impugned law may still be upheld if it satisfies the Oakes test.
Under the Oakes test, the legislative provision must (1) serve a
pressing and substantial purpose, (2) be rationally connected to
that purpose, (3) impair the right only to the extent necessary to
achieve the objective, and (4) not have a disproportionately severe
effect on the persons to whom it applies.'" Under Oakes, the
burden of proof is on the government to show that the
constitutional violation is justifiable on a balance of probabilities.'45
As recognized by Justice Wilson in Andrews, "[g]iven that
[section] 15 is designed to protect those groups who suffer social,
political and legal disadvantage in our society, the burden resting
on government to justify the type of discrimination against such
groups is appropriately an onerous one. ' 46

143.
144.
145.
146.

McLachlin, supra note 103, at 564.
The Queen v. Oakes, [19861 S.C.R. 103, 105-106.
See id.
Andrews, [1989] 56 D.L.R. 1 at 34.
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My discussion on the reasonable limits of equality rights has
been confined to Canadian jurisprudence because Canada has
developed the most sophisticated rights-limitations framework
among the jurisdictions explored in the earlier parts of this Article.
Admittedly, South Africa's limitations analysis is equally nuanced,
but because it is a derivative of the Oakes test, it is thus
conceptually identical to the Canadian approach.47
In the United States, different justificatory standards of
equality rights-limitations exist for different bases of
discrimination. In instances of gender discrimination, the state may
override the constitutional right to equal protection if it can show
that the legislative classifications serve "important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are
''8
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.
Racial discrimination, on the other hand, is subjected to the "most
rigid scrutiny.' ' 149 Courts would only sustain racial classifications if
there is an "overriding purpose"' ° and these classifications are
"necessary.. .to the accomplishment of a permissible state
policy.""'
Despite the different tiers of scrutiny that exist in American
jurisprudence, the limitation analysis in the United States is still
conceptually similar to the Canadian Oakes approach as they both
examine the weight of the overriding statutory ends and the
reasonableness of the means by which the goals are attained. To
date, neither Malaysia 112 nor Singapore 1 3 has articulated an

147. In State v. Makwanyane, Chaskalson P. held that in deciding whether the limits
placed on the right in question by the state were reasonable, relevant considerations
include "the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to
such a society; the extent of the limitation.., and particularly where the limitation has to
be necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other means
less damaging to the right in question." 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), available at
http://www.concourt.gov.za/cases.php.
148. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)) (emphasis added). Despite the absence of a
specific or general limitation clause to the right of equality enshrined under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has placed implied limitations on the
exercise of this constitutional right.
149. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
150. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (emphasis added).
151. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (emphasis added).
152. MALAY. CONST. pt. II, § 8(2).
153. SING. CONST. pt. IV, art. 12(2).
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interpretive framework that seeks to limit a person's right to equal
protection.
Once the state action or legislation fails to conform to the
tests laid out in the American and Canadian models of equality, a
person's right to equality is infringed and no further limitations of
this right are permitted. Given their minimalist notions of equality
that fail to consider the criteria of relevance, i.e., statutory
classifications, which may be legislatively determined, further
limits on the right to equality may be unnecessary. Placing limits
on the right may even be prejudicial, as this would further erode
state of the constitutional right to equal
the already15impoverished
4
protection.
The relationship between equality rights and their limits can
not be overemphasized. A discussion of the legal models of
equality would be incomplete without first analyzing the
interpretive theories of reasonable limits that may be placed on
this right. After all, the resultant right of equality conferred by the
Constitution is the compromise between equality rights and their
limits.
According to Alan Brudner, the relationshig between rights
and their limits may be conceived in two ways. First, a Millian
understanding of rights and their limits perceives a constitutionally
protected right as the legal recognition of a weighty interest that
could be sacrificed if necessary to maximize overall social
welfare.'56 Second, a Kantian approach perceives a constitutional
right as the respect paid to a human being's "capacity for freely
forming and pursuing interests" that is "the basis of their claim to
' According to the latter view, rights cannot be forfeited
dignity."157
merely for utilitarian purposes. Instead, a constitutional right
may be limited only when another human agent exercises a
competing constitutional right, or when it is necessary to preserve
the system of rights that underpins the legal order. 9
154. On the other hand, one could argue that the presence of a limitation clause, either
implied or express, would liberate these jurisdictions from their narrow interpretations of
equality.
155. Brudner, supranote 19, at 290.
156. Brudner calls this the "Millian understanding of rights and their limits," since
John Stuart Mills pioneered the view that "rights are merely legally protected interests of
great weight." See id. at 290-91.
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. See id at 292.
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Brudner suggests that both theories of reasonable limits to
rights are compatible with the Oakes test.16° He argues, however,
that the Kantian understanding of rights and its limits is a better
theory of that relationship as "[a] theory of reasonable limits to
rights that can countenance limits inconsistent with a free society
will, following Oakes, be inferior [to] a theory that will accept only
limits consistent with a free society." 16 Brudner further argues
that, in contrast, "the Millian understanding of reasonable limits
will accept limits incompatible with a free society, because it will
permit the sacrifice of the liberty of some to the greater welfare of
others. And, since no self-respecting person would consent to a
law that treated him as a means to another good, such. a law could
162
not be justified in a society of free and equal persons.,
Admittedly, Brudner was arguing in the context of section 1 of the
Charter which forms the textual bedrock of the Oakes test. 63
Amongst the jurisdictions discussed in this Article, only South
Africa shares a similar express general limitation clause that
permits reasonable state derogation of enshrined constitutional
rights, including a person's right to equality. 164 But the absence of a
general limitation clause should not estop other jurisdictions from
engaging in the same interpretive analysis of rights and their limits.
Courts from every jurisdiction have recognized that no
constitutional right can be deemed absolute and they have all
placed either express or implied limitations on the exercise of
these sacrosanct rights. Moreover, a broader principle may be
extracted from Brudner's analysis that is relevant to other national
courts engaged in the same task of defining reasonable limits on
rights: "[a] limit on a right has to be theoretically consistent with
the values underlying the right; it cannot simply contradict the
right.' ' 165 Thus, if one accepts that constitutional rights are

fundamental liberties that have been deemed sacrosanct enough to
be expressed in a written charter that is irrevocable by an ordinary
160. See id at 293.
161. Brudner, supranote 19, at 294.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 293-94. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter reads: "The Canadian Charterof
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of

Rights and Freedoms), § 1.
164. Makwanyane, [1995] 3 S.A. 391 at col. 100.
165. Brudner, supranote 19, at 293.
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majority, one has to then acknowledge that the Kantian approach
to rights is the only theory of limits that respects these rights. The
Kantian approach applies because it stringently limits the types of
public goals that may override the rights in question. It also
ensures that any infringement of rights is rational and necessary to
achieve the right's overriding goals.'6 Thus, it is open to all
national courts, within or without Canada, to adopt such an
interpretive theory of reasonable limits of rights when they
embrace the substantive model of equality.
While Canada has developed a robust jurisprudence on
equality over recent years, its supreme court has unfortunately
been equivocal about which theory of reasonable limits of rights is
superior. The Supreme Court of Canada has been oscillating
between the Kantian and Millian visions of substantive equality in
its enforcement of the Oakes test.167 A Millian approach to rights
may be observed in the recent case of Lavoie.'68 The court agreed
that a legislative provision, which gave preference to Canadian
citizens in public service employment, discriminated against noncitizens but held that this form of discrimination could be
demonstrably justified in accordance to the Oakes test. 169 The
legislative purpose in Lavoie that warranted a derogation of a
constitutional right was the encouragement of naturalization by
permanent citizens.170
Lavoie suggests that the constitutional right to equal
protection must be observed by the state except when the
legislature wants to enhance the attractiveness and value of
citizenship. While such a statutory policy was legitimate and
laudable, the Lavoie court's stance reflected a "Millian
understanding of rights as highly valued interests that can be
outweighed by even more highly valued ones rather than a
Kantian understanding of rights as constraints on the pursuit of
ordinary public goals."'' The Supreme Court of Canada has not
only permitted a person's constitutional right to equality to be
overridden by common public goals, it has also been less vigorous

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 292.
Id. at 294.
Lavoie v. Canada, [20021 S.C.R. 769.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 815.
Brudner, supra note 19, at 300-01.
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in enforcing the requisites of rationality and necessity in the Oakes
test.
In upholding the legislative provision under the rational nexus
limb of the Oakes test, the majority of the Lavoie court observed
that there was a rational connection between the legislative
objectives of enhancing the value of citizenship and encouraging
naturalization amongst immigrants. 172 Strangely, on the facts, the
court came to such a conclusion without any evidence from the
government proving that the exclusion of non-citizens from federal
employment would further the above-mentioned twin objectives.173
The majority addressed this difficulty by simply stating that
"Parliament is entitled to some deference as to whether one
privilege or another advances a compelling state interest.' 174 The
dissenting voices of Judge L'Heureux-Dub6 and Chief Judge
McLachlin rejected this argument by stating that "judicial
175
deference alone cannot establish a rational connection.'
Unfortunately, for the majority, a legislative appeal to "common
sense" without
the production of any evidence satisfies the rational
176
nexus test.
The application of the rational connection test was equally
disappointing in McKinney.177 In McKinney, the supreme court
agreed that the legislative exclusion of persons above the age of
sixty-five from statutory protection under the Ontario Human
Rights Code was discriminatory. The court held, however, that
such a limitation was justified.17 As observed by the majority, the
impugned provisions of the provincial code, by implicitly
permitting mandatory retirement at age sixty-five, "achieves its
purpose of maintaining stability in pension arrangements, and is
thus rationally connected to that end." 179 Justice L'Heureux Dub6,
in her dissenting judgment, applied the rational connection test
more stringently: "the requirement of rational connection calls for
an assessment of how well the legislative garment has been

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Lavoie, [2002] S.C.R. at 818-20.
Id.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 819.
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178. Id. at 319.
179. Id.at 304.
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tailored to suit its purpose." 1 Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 rejected
the existence of a rational nexus because the legislative provisions
in question did not exclusively deal with mandatory retirement nor
did they confine themselves to the stated objectives of the
legislature.18 As opined by her Lordship, the impugned provision
of the provincial Human Rights Code denied protection against
employment discrimination to those over age sixty-five even if
there was no pension plan or even when the integrity of the
existing pension plan would not be affected if employees did not
retire at age sixty-five.182 Unfortunately, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's
observations were all lost on the majority.
The same deference to the legislature may be observed in the
McKinney court's application of the minimal impairment test. In
Oakes, for an impugned legislative provision to survive the
minimal impairment scrutiny, Chief Justice Dickson held that the
government had to adduce compelling evidence that the
constitutional right in question had been impaired "as little as
possible., 183 Moreover, the court would need to know what other
alternative measures were open to the legislature in the
implementation of the legislative goals.1' 8
By the time McKinney came along, the supreme court had
shifted ground and was willing to provide the government
considerable leeway when the state interest in question involved
the "the reconciliation of claims of competing individuals or
groups or the distribution of scarce... resources, 18 ' as opposed to
the imposition of criminal sanctions on individuals. In the former
scenario, "the appropriate balance between interests is a political
decision, one that depends on social science evidence concerning
which there is no certainty, and so the decision must be entrusted
to the political discretion of accountable representatives."' 86 In
such cases, the court would not subject the legislature to the
minimal impairment requirement. So long as the government had
"a reasonable basis for concluding that the legislation impaired the

180. Id. at 434 (quoting R. v. Edwards Books and Art, Ltd., [1986] S.C.R. 713).
181. Id. at 443.
182. Id. at 434.
183. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. at 106.
184. Id. at 138.
185. McKinney, [19901 S.C.R. at 281 (quoting Irwin Toy, Ltd. v. Quebec, [1989] S.C.R.
927, 994).
186. Brudner, supra note 19, at 303.
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relevant right as little as possible," the discriminatory legislation
would be upheld on this basis. In the criminal context, the court's
expertise in criminal law would require a much higher degree of
certainty in the scrutiny of legislative decisions.' 87
Yet, the supreme court did not stay true to their word in
maintaining a dichotomy between criminal and non-penal cases. In
Rodriguez, a majority of the court conceded that the criminal code
prohibition against assisted suicide discriminated against disabled
persons who were physically incapable of committing suicide
without assistance.'w The court nevertheless held that such a
limitation was justifiable.! 9 The same deference to legislative
policy was shown by the court in this criminal case.'9 Justice
Sopinka opined for the majority: "in dealing with this 'contentious'
and 'morally laden' issue, Parliament must be accorded some
flexibility." 9 ' Furthermore, Justice Spinka argued that so long as
the government had a reasonable basis for concluding that it had
complied with the requirement of minimal impairment, "it is not
the proper function of this Court to speculate as to whether other
alternatives available to Parliament might have been
preferable."' 9
Chief Justice Lamer, in dissent, was more vigorous in
applying the traditional Oakes test.9 Chief Justice Lamer noted
that there are a "range of options from which Parliament may
choose in seeking to safeguard the interests of the vulnerable and
still ensure the equal right to self-determination of persons with
physical disabilities.' ' 194 He found that an absolute prohibition of
assisted suicide that was indifferent to the individual and his
circumstances could not "satisfy the constitutional duty on the
government to impair the rights of persons with physical
disabilities as little as reasonably possible." 9'
A Kantian understanding of reasonable limits to rights may
be observed in Vriend.' 6 In that case, the supreme court held that
187. McKinney, [1990] S.C.R. at 309.
188. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, [19931 S.C.R. 519,612-613.
189. See id. at 615.
190. See id. at 614-15.
191. Id. at 614.
192. Id. at 614-615.
193.
See id. at 558-69.
10
cd
,-11,79G
,nr.v,1 S.C.R. at 569.
....Ro~"drguezi
195. Id.
196. Vriend, [1998] S.C.R. at 579.
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the legislative omission of sexual orientation as a prohibited
ground of discrimination in a provincial human rights legislation
was discriminatory and could not be justified.'97 From the outset,
the court rigorously applied the Oakes test. Justice lacobucci,
writing for the majority, rejected the government's submission that
only the overall objectives of the legislation needed to be
examined. 98 Instead, when an impugned statute was underinclusive, the government had to also "demonstrate that the
'objective' of the omission is pressing and substantial."' 99 In this
case, alleged "moral considerations that likely informed the
legislature's choice," without evidence supporting the allegation,
was insufficient to constitute a pressing substantial purpose that
could override a Charter right. °°
The majority in Vriend was also equally diligent in applying
the rational connection test. The government argued that a
rational connection to the purpose of a statute could be achieved
through the use of incremental means which, over time, expand
the scope of the legislation to all those whom the legislature
determines to be in need of statutory protection. Rejecting this
submission, Justice Iacobucci held rather laudably that "groups
that have historically been the target of discrimination cannot be
expected to wait patiently for the protection of their human
dignity and equal rights while governments move toward reform
one step at a time. 21 If the infringement of the rights and freedoms
of these groups is permitted to persist while governments fail to
pursue equality diligently, then the guarantees
201 of the Charter will
words.
empty
than
more
little
to
be reduced
Subsequently, in M v. H, the Canadian judiciary was equally
adamant about scrutinizing constitutional violations.20 The
supreme court held that a provincial spousal support regime,
which excluded statutory protection to persons in same sex
relationships, was discriminatory and could not be reasonably
justified. 2°4 The court's application of the minimal impairment test

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 579.
See id. at 556.
Id.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 559.
Vriend, [1998] S.C.R. at 559-60.
M v. H, [1999] S.C.R. 3.[1999] S.C.R. at 89.
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in M v. H was particularly praiseworthy. In rejecting the argument
"that the government should be accorded time to amend
discriminatory legislation," Justice Iacobucci, for the majority,
held that where there was no evidence of progress by the
legislature in its attempts to move towards Charter compliance,
then "deference as to the timing of reforms loses its raison
d'9tre.' '2°5 Unlike the highly deferential stance taken later in
Lavoie, the court emphasized here that "[d]eference must not be
carried to the point of relieving the government of the burden
which the Charterplaces upon it of demonstrating
that the limits it
2
has imposed are reasonable and justifiable. a
The Supreme Court of Canada's haphazard oscillation
between the Kantian and Millian understanding of rights and their
limits may reflect in part the court's doubts about its own
competence to analyze broad social policy issues. For instance,
Justice La Forest consistently exhorted the court to defer to the
legislature's will whenever a dispute arose over the allocation of
scarce resources. He argued frequently that the courts should
permit incremental solutions to discrimination and not "secondguess legislative judgment as to just how quickly it should proceed
in moving forward towards the ideal of equality., 02 7 Perhaps Chief
Justice Beverley McLachlin voiced the most eloquent defense of
the court's activist stance:
Parliament has its role: to choose the appropriate response to
social problems within the limiting framework of the
Constitution. But the courts also have a role: to determine,
objectively and impartially, whether Parliament's choice falls
within the limiting framework of the Constitution. The courts
are no more permitted to abdicate their responsibility than is
Parliament. To carry judicial deference to the point of accepting
Parliament's view simply on the basis that the problem is
serious and the solution is difficult, would be to diminish the
role of the courts in the constitutional process and to weaken
the structure of rights upon which our constitution and our
nation is founded.
The interaction between equality rights and their limits can
never be overstated. An analysis on the existing legal models of
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 81.
id. at 82 (quoting RIR-MacDonald inc. v. Canada [1995] S.C.R. 199, 332).
McKinney, [1990] S.C.R. at 317-318.
MacDonald,[1995] S.C.R. at 332-33.
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equality would be incomplete without a concurrent examination of
the interpretive theories of reasonable limits that may be placed
on this right. Even if a jurisdiction adheres to a substantive vision
of equality, this robust ideal may be undercut by a utilitarian
calculus of rights and their limits. A Kantian interpretive
construction of constitutional rights and their limits, as discussed
earlier, is equally plausible if not superior to a consequentialist
reading of reasonable limits. As argued by Dwight Newman,
"Freedom and democracy are not just about social utility.
Although consequentialist outlooks are relevant, they should not
be the sum total of our construction of the fate of human
dignity.'2°9
V. CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have attempted to demonstrate that four
models of equality can be gleaned from the constitutional
jurisprudence of Malaysia, Singapore, India, the United States,
South Africa, and Canada. Since absolute equality amongst all
persons is impossible and differential treatment amongst groups of
persons is inevitable, the substantive model of equality, as
embodied by the Canadian approach, stands out as the most
principled paradigm as it permits judicial scrutiny into the moral
relevance of the criteria or traits that the legislature has used to
justify differential or identical treatment amongst groups of
persons.
Recognizing the substantive model of equality as the most
logical and meaningful constitutional principle against arbitrary
state action is only the first step. This recognition must be
complemented with a Kantian theory of reasonable limits to rights
that seek to reconcile the exercise of competing rights and
interests within the legal system. The deontological principle of
reasonable limits, as embodied by the Kantian theory, is premised
on the understanding that any inquiry into the limits of rights must
be conducted in light of a commitment to uphold the rights and
freedoms set out in other sections of the Constitution.
Admittedly, none of the jurisdictions discussed has
successfully achieved such a constitutional feat. But Canada is
certainly leading the pack in its ideological evolution toward
209. Dwight Newman, The Limitation of Rights: A Comparative Evolution and
Ideology of the Oakes and Sparrow Tests, 62 SASK. L. REV. 543 (1999).
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substantive equality and a Kantian justificatory standard of rightslimitations. One can only hope that the other jurisdictions will
soon catch up.

